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Abstract 
Aithough previous studies have examined whether 3-year-old children can 
appeal to a hlse belief to explain another person's misguided action (e.g., Bartsch 
& Wellman, 1989; Wirnmer & Weichbold, 1994; Wimmer & Mayringer, 1998), there 
exist no studies that have examined how children explain their own actions that 
were premised on a false belief. The goal of this dissertation is to determine 
whether 3-year-old dùldren, who are typically unable to reason in terms of false 
belief, will appeal to a false belief to explain their own misguided actions. 
in Expenment 1,3-year-old children were given an action task in which 
they were required to act on the basis of a false belief. For instance, diildren were 
shown a crayon box and were asked to state what they thought was inside. After 
stating their belief. duldren went to get a piece of paper to draw on. The 
unexpected contents of the box were then revealed, and children were asked both 
a false belief question (i.e., "Before, when you first saw the box al1 closed up like 
this, what did you think was inside?") and an action ex~lanation question (i.e., 
"Why did you go get the paper [then]?") Results revealed that chiidren who 
answered the false belief question incorrectly were rarely able to explain their 
action in trms of a false belief. However, despite incorrect responses to both 
questions, the marner in which dùldren answered the action exdanation question 
differed in important respects from how they answered the false belief question. 
These differences are discussed with respect to both the "reality bias," and the 
theory-theory view of development. 
In a second experiment, children's performance on the action task was 
direct1 y compared to their performance on a standard unexpected contents task 
(e.g., Gopnik & Astùigton, 1988). Ln addition, a third task (plannine + action task) 
was devised in which children planned and then acted on the basis of the* false 
belief. Results indicated that children were able to retrieve their false belief 
significantly more often in the plannine - + action task, as compared to the standard 
unexpected contents task. Once again though, children who answered the false 
belief question incorrectly were shilarly unable to appeal to a false belief 
explain their action. 
Consis tent wi th previous research, the resul ts of bo th Experiments 
to 
1 and 2 
indicate that 3-year-old children have substantial difficulty reasoning in terms of 
hlse belief. However, results also indicated that planning and acting on a false 
belief may enable better retrieval. Finally, these studies highlight the fact that 
asking children to explain an action of theîrs that was premised on a false belief, 
differs in many respects from simply aslcing children to retneve a false belief. 
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A 3-year-old chld is shown a crayon box and is asked to state what she 
thinks is inside. After she has stated "crayons," the box is opened to reveal 
candles. Once the box is closed up again, she is asked what she had initially 
thought was inside. Her response, like that of most typical3-year-olds, is 
"candles," not crayons. However, consider what would happen if this procedure 
were modified in the following way: After the child has stated that she thinks the 
box contains crayons, she is asked to get a piece of paper to draw on. Upon 
returning with the paper, she is shown the candles. The box is closed up again and 
she is asked to state what she had initially believed it to contain. When she 
responds "candles," she is asked to explain whv she went to eet the paper. Will 
a s h g  her to explain her previous action now allow her to access her false belief? 
The answer to this question is the focus of this thesis. 
An understanding that our false beliefs can lie at the root of Our actions is 
essential in acquiring a mature theory of how the mind works. This understanding 
encompasses both our ability to predict how someone with a false belief will 
behave, as well as exvlain behaviour that was premised on a false belief. Theory of 
mind research has traditionally focussed on the former (e.g., Wimrner & Pemer, 
1983; Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Pemer & W h e r ,  1988; Clernents & 
Pemer, 1994; Wellrnan, Cross, & Watson, 2001). For example, in the now-dassic 
chanee-in-location task, diildren are shown a character named Maxi who puts 
some chocolate in a cupboard and then goes outside to play. While he is outside, 
Maxi's mother transfers his chocolate to the fridge. Upon Maxi's retum, children 
are asked to predict where he will look for his chocolate. Results from this task 
have shown that 3-year-old children generally have difficulty predicting Maxi's 
action on the basis of his false belief, and instead predict that he will look for the 
chocolate where it currently resides (e.g., Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Pemer, 
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). This finding has often been interpreted as indicative of 
a fundamental flaw in 3-year-olds' reasoning about false beliefs and the ünk 
between false belief and action (Pemer, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
However, sudi a conclusion may be premature without first considering 
how children perfonn when asked to explain an action that was premised on a 
false belief. For instance, do children find it any easier to reason in terrns of false 
belief if they watch Maxi search for his chocolate in the empty cupboard, and are 
then asked to explain his action? In this case, children are in the position to 
witness a perplexing inconsistency between Maxi's behaviour and the true state of 
the world (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Moses, 1993). To correctly explain and make 
sense of Maxi's behaviour, they must appeal to Maxi's false belief (e.g., Maxi 
thinks the chocolate is in the cupboard). That is, although Maxi's behaviour is 
inconsistent with reality (Le., chocolate in the fridge), it is consistent with his false 
belief. It is in this sense that Maxi's action serves as an important cue to his false 
belief (Moses & Flavell, 1990). In contrast, in w g  Maxi's action, the scenario 
is quite different. Here, children can rnake the perfectly consistent, but incorrect, 
ciairn that Maxi will look for his chocolate where it currently resides. Thus, in 
theory, there is reason to believe that children may find it easier to reason in terms 
of false belief when they are asked to explain an action that was premised on a 
false belief, rather than to predict how someone with a false belief will behave. 
Such an argument has been put forth, and investigated, by researchers such as 
Bartsch & Wellman (1989) and Robinson & Mitchell (1995), and so 1 will begin by 
reviewing the results of these two studies. 
Studies suaestinp: an earlier competence in exdaining: versus ~redictine an action 
premised on a false belief 
Bartxh and Wellman (1989, Experirnent 2) gave 3-year-old children a series 
of explanation and prediction tasks and compared their performance on each. An 
example of an explanation task was as follows. Children were snown a plain box, 
and a Band-Aid box, and were asked to choose the box that they thought 
contained Band-Aids. The majority of the diildren chose the Band-Aid box only to 
discover that it was empty, whereas the plain box contained Band-Aids. Children 
were then introduced to a puppet, Bill, who had a cut. Children watched as Bill 
searched in the Band-Aid box (which did not contain Band-Aids) and were then 
asked: "Why do you think he's looking in there?" If children did not respond, or 
responded by making reference to something other than Bill's belief, they were 
given the following prompt: "What does Bill W?" Children's answers to the 
explanation task were considered to be correct if they included reference to a false 
belief in respowe to either the initial question (i.e., "Why do you think he's 
looking in there?"), or to the prompt (Le., "What does Bill think?"). Correct 
responses to the prompt were followed by the control question, "Are the Band- 
Aids there reallv?" This control question was asked to ensure that children had 
not forgotten the actual contents of the container. Correct responses to the initial 
question included "Because he thinks there's Band-Aids in it," whereas correct 
responses to the prompt included "that there are Band-Aids in there." 
An example of a prediction task, on the other hand, was as follows. 
Children were told "Look, here's Pam. Pam has a cut, see? And she wants a Band- 
Aid. Where do you think she will look for Band-Aids?" Children could respond 
either verbally, or by pointuig. Children's performance on the 
(31% correct) waç significantly lower than their performance on the explanation 
tasks (66% correct). These findings support the hypothesis that having children 
witness a character who behaves in a marner that is inconsistent with reality, 
results in a greater ability to reason in terms of false belief, than when children are 
asked to predict how a character with a false belief will behave. 
However, tlus conclusisn has not gone unchallenged (Moses & Flavell, 
1990; Pemer, 1991). Pemer (1991) has argued that children who were classified as 
providing a correct response in Bartsch & Wellman's (1989) explanation tasks may 
have done so without genuinely appealing to a false belief. Pemer argues that in 
the explanation tasks, children may have assumed that the puppet was acting "as- 
if" the Band-Aids were in the empty box, a h  to the puppet "thinking-of" or 
"pretending" that they were in there. As such, Pemer states that it is not clear 
whether children did indeed use the word "think in their explanations to refer to 
the puppet's misremesentation of the tnie situation (Le., whether children 
genuinely acknowledged that the puppet held a false belief). Perner argues that 
the prediction task, on the other hand, did not lead children to interpret the word 
"think" as "thinking-of" or "pretending," and thus may have accounted for why 
children did not perform as well on the prediction task. Based on the results of the 
Bartsdi and Wellman (1989) study alone, it is unclear whether 3-year-olds are 
genuinely better at appealing to a false belief when they are asked to explain, 
rather than predict, a character's misguided action. 
Using a differen t methodology, Robinson and Mitchell (1995) have also 
argued that fyear-old children are better at explaining, rather than predicting, a 
character's misguided action. in their study, children were presented with a story 
that involved two identical twins. In this story, one of the twins knows the 
location of a ball while the other does not because he was outside when the ball 
was moved from its original, to its current, location. In the exolanation condition, 
this unknowledgeable twin is then shown going to the original (and incorrect) 
location in response to his mother's query "Where's the ball?" while the other twin 
goes to the ball's current location. Children were then asked the following test 
question about the unknowledgeable twin: "So this one's gone to the wrong place 
hasn't he? Why's he gone to the wrong place; is it because he went outside or 
because he's stayed inside?" Another group of children was given the prediction 
condition in which they were asked the test question: "Now where will he go first 
of ail to look for the ball, here or here?" Results indicated that children in the 
exdanation condition correctly answered the test question 85% of the time which 
was significantiy higher than dUldren in the prediction condition who answered 
correctly only 30% of the time. 
Yet again, it is unclear whether children's performance in the explanation 
condition was genuinely superior to their performance in the prediction condition. 
Specificallv, Pemer (1995) has pointed out that there exists an imbalance in 
baseline responding between Robinson and Mitchell's (1995) explanation and 
prediction conditions. Pemer (1995) argues that in the prediction condition, 
children who do not have an understanding of false belief will make the classic 
error oi predicting that the character wili search for his bal1 in its current location 
(reality error), rather than where the character falsely believes it to be. On the 
other hand, this error dws not apply to the explanation condition. Recall ba t  in 
this case, children were asked "Why's he gone to the wrong place; is it because he 
went outside or because he stayed inside?" For a child with no understanding of 
false belief, either of these options is equaily plausible, thus resuiting in a 50% 
chance of answering correctly. Thus, without any understanding cf false belief, 
children should already show superior performance in the explanation condition. 
Although the data from Bartsch and Welhan  (1989), and Robinson and 
Mitchell (1995), suggest that 3-year-olds are able to reason in terms of false belief 
when they can witness a character act in a manner that is inconsistent with reality, 
several methodological limitations have rendered these findings difficult to 
interpret. Moreover, as will be discussed next, there exist a number of studies that 
have found some striking limitations with respect to how 3- year-old diildren 
explain a character's action that was premised on a false belief (Moses & Flavell, 
1990; Wimrner & Weichbold, 1994; Wimmer & Mayringer, 1998). 
Studies suggesting that 3-vear-olds have difficultv explainine an action ~remised 
on a false belief 
Moses and Flavell(1990, Experiment 2) showed a group of 3-year-old 
children several videotaped false belief scenarios. In one such scenario, a character 
named Mary enters a room shaking her hand while saying "Ouch my finger hurts! 
I'm looking for a Band-Aid." Mary then spots a Band-Aid box on the table and 
savs, "Ah, here are some Band-Aids." Mary opens the box to discover that it 
contains a toy car and exclaims, "Hey, there's a car in here! Where are the Band- 
Aids?" At this point in the protocol, the videotape was stopped and children were 
asked a series of questions. Included in this series were (1) a false belief question: 
"Let's remember back to when Mary first saw the box. What did Mary think was 
gonna be in the box before she opened it? A car, or Band-Aids?"; (2) an action 
ex~lanation question: "Why was Mary looking in the box?"; and (3) a goal 
question: "What was she looking for?" Despite having observed Mary's 
misguided action, children answered the false belief question correctly on only 
47% of the trials which was not above the level that would be expeded by chance. 
Children were equallv unable to appeal to a false belief to explain Mary's action, 
despite being almost at ceiling in correctly answering the question about Mary's 
goal (e.g., she's looking for Band-Aids). That is, although dllldren clearly 
undestood that Mary's goal was to find Band-Aids, they were unable to 
understand that the direct cause of her action was her false belief that the box 
contained Band-Aids. Childrenrs incorrect explanations to the question "Why was 
Mary looking in the box?" most often included references to the outcorne of the 
situation, (e.g., because there's a car in there), or to Mary's desire (e.g., because she 
wants Band-Aids). 
A similar limitation on children's understanding of the link between false 
belief and action has also been reported in several subsequent studies. For 
example, Wimmer and Weichbold (1994) were interested in children's 
understanding of what leads to a character's (e.g., Maxi) misguided action in the 
change-in-location task. Thus, 3- and 4year-old children were given a standard 
change-in-location task and were asked to predict where Maxi would search for 
hs chocolate. If children correctly predicted that Maxi would look in the empty 
location, where he falsely believed his chocolate to be, they were asked to explain 
whv Maxi would look there. If children incorrectly predicted that Maxi would 
look for his chocolate in its current location, they were first corrected (e-g., "No, 
look what Maxi does. He doesn't look here for his chocolate. He goes to this 
cupboard to get his chocolate"), and then were asked why Maxi would search in 
that (correct) location. Despite the fact that providing diildren with the correct 
location allowed them to witness Maxi's misguided action, none of the 28 3-year- 
olds in this shtdy was able to correctly explain Maxi's action by appealing to 
Maxi's false belief. 
In a similar study, Wimmer and Mayringer (1998) included a 
straightforward emlanation-onlv condition, in which children were told a story 
about Ann who hides her book in a cloakroom cupboard before she goes outside 
to play. In her absence, her teacher moves the book from the cloakroom cupboard 
to a cupboard in the playroom. Ann then cornes badc inside and wants to get her 
book. Ann is then shown going to the cloakroom to get her book, at whch point 
children were asked: "Why then does Ann go to the cloakroom to get her book?" 
If children did not provide an explanation, or responded in an inadequate manner, 
the experimenter rephrased the question as one involving belief: "Ann goes into 
the cloakroom, because she thinks the book is in this cupboard. Why then does 
AM think the book is in this cupboard?" Children's responses to the explanation 
question were coded as correct when a child provided an appropriate response to 
the explana tion question itself (e.g., "because she doesn't know where the book is 
now"), or to the follow-up question involving belief (e.g, "because the book was in 
here"). Results indicated that barely a third of the children between 3 1 /2 and 4 
1 /2  years of age appropriately explained Ann's misguided action. Children's 
inappropriate explanations were of several types. Among these was a tendency to 
refer to Ann's desire (e.g., "because she wants her book"), which explains why 
Ann went somewhere to get her book, but not why she chose to go to the empty 
location. The second type of explanation that children often provided was one 
which made reference to the present location of the book (e.g., "because it's in here 
[pointing to the playroom cupboard] "). Thus, even when directly questioned 
about Ann's misguided action, children were rarely able to make sense of it by 
appealing to Ann's false belief. 
Thus, to date, the hypothesis that 3-year-old children are successful at 
invoking a false belief to explain a character's misguided action, has not received 
strong empirical support. 
Re-evaluatine: - the evidence to date 
in light of the findings discussed in the previous section, should we simply 
accept the conclusion that 3-year-olds are unable to correctly explain an action that 
was premised on a false belief? Not necessarily. hstead, 1 argue that this 
hypothesis has never been tested in the most direct manner possible. Specifically, 
there exist several important reasons why it may have been difficult for the 
children in the previous studies to make sense of a character's misguided action 
bv appealing to the character's false belief. First, it is possible that obsewing 
another person's misguided action is not a sufficiently salient cue to false belief. A 
more powerful manipulation would be to have children themselves perform an 
action that is premised upon their own false belief. When asked to explain their 
own misguided action, it may be clearer to children that their action was caused 
by their false belief. Lndeed, this "intuitive" view has also been espoused by Moses 
(1993) who states the following: "Children's own feelings of volition and agency 
prior to acting, and energy expenditure while carrying out their actions, are 
presurnably very saiient at an early age. It is hard to imagine that very young 
children would not also have some sense of whv they are doing what they are 
doing: that is, a sense of the goals driving their efforts" (p. 21). At a more 
theoretical level, such a claim is supported by simulation-theorists who argue that 
first-person psychological knowledge is especially powerful because it is direct, 
rather than being the result of inference or construction (Hams, 1992). Thus, there 
is reason to believe that the psychological causes of action (e.g., false belief) may 
be easier to access when the action is camed out by the self. However, it should be 
noted that it is an ongoing debate whether an understanding of one's own muid 
should emerge prior to an understanding of the minds of others. For instance, 
there is evidence that children's ability to acknowledge their own prior false belief 
is not easier than acknowledpg another's false belief (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; 
Wirnmer & Hartl, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
There exists no prior research, however, that has directly examined how 
children explain their own action that was premised on a false belief. However, 
related to this question, Riggs and Robinson (1995a) reasoned that if 3-year-old 
children could accurately recall an action of theirs that was premised on a false 
belief, this should in tum allow them to acknowledge that belief. In their study, 
diiidren were seated at a table facing an egg box and a margarine tub. The 
experimenter then said: "I've got these boxes, can you get me an egg?" Children 
reached over and opened the egg box only to discover that it was empty. The 
expenmenter then opened the margarine tub to reveal an egg. At this point, 
children were asked both an action question, "Let's remember, when you hst saw 
these boxes, before we opened them, where did you go to get the egg?" and a 
belief question, "Let's remember, when you first saw these boxes, before we -
opened them, where did you think the egg was?" These questions were asked in 
counterbalanced order, such that half the children were first asked about their 
action and then about their belief, whereas the other half were first asked about 
their belief and then about their action. According to Riggs and Robinson, the 
ordering of these two questions was potentially important because dllldren might 
find it easier to appeal to their false belief after having explicitly stated their 
action, rather than the reverse. That is, Riggs and Robinson argued that it is 
nonwnsical to claim that you opened the egg box to get an egg, and then to state 
that vou believed the egg to be in the margarine tub. Interestingly, the results did 
not support this prediction: children provided no more correct responses to the 
belief question when the action question preceded, rather than followed, it. 
Overall, 8796 of the children correctly remembered their action, whereas only 43% 
correctlv remembered their belief. 
However, what Etiggs and Robinson's (1995a) study did not address, was 
how children would have reacted had they been asked to explain, rather than 
simply recall, their prior action. Ln order to address this question, one could ask 
children who incorrectly state that they initially believed the margarine tub to 
contain an egg, to immediately exvlain why they reached over to the egg box to 
retrieve it. in so doing, the inconsistency between duldren's incorrect reality- 
based response (i.e., margarine tub), and their prior action of seardiing for the egg 
in the egg box, would be clearly highlighted. Such a direct style of questioning 
may be crucial in giving children the insight that the cause of their action was their 
earlier belief about the contents of the box. Indeed, according to the theory-theory 
view of development, salient counterevidence is one way to provoke children to 
revise theories that are faulty (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; Gopnik, 1996a; Gopnik, 1996b; Gopnik dE Meltzoff, 1997). Thus, asking 
children to explain a previous action that was caused by their earlier belief may be 
an espetially powerful means of providing counter-evidence to an incorrect, or 
incomplete, understanding of the role that false belief plays in determining action. 
in sum, 1 argue that although previous studies have shown that 3-year-olds 
have difficultv explaining an action that was premised on a false belief, what 
remains unclear is whether this difficulty can be ovemdden by giving dUldren a 
task which meets the following two aitena: (1) children themselves perform the 
misguided action, and (2) children's response to the fa ix  belief question is 
imrnediately followed up by asking them to explain their misguided action. 
Experiment 1 was designed to meet these two aiteria. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, a novel paradign adapted from the unexpected contents 
task (e.g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988) was developed. in a typical unexpected 
contents task, duldren are shown a familiar container, sudi as a crayon box, and 
are asked to state its contents. After children state "crayons," they are shown that 
the box actually contains candles. The box is then closed up and children are asked 
the following type of test question about their previous belief (i.e., false belief 
question): "Before, when you first saw the box, all closed up like this, what did 
vou think was inside?" (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996; Welch-Ross, 1997). Three-year- 
old children will typically respond "candles," thus failing to acknowledge their 
earlier belief. The procedure for the adapted unexpected contents task, referred to 
as  the action task, was as iollows. Chiidren were shown a crayon box and were 
asked to state their belief about its contents. After sta ting "crayons." the 
experimenter pointed out to the children that there was a piece of paper on the 
Aoor, and suggested that they go get it to draw on with the crayons. When the 
children returned with the piece of paper, it was revealed that the box contained 
candles. Once the box was closed up, duldren were asked what they had initidy 
believed it to contain. AU children were then asked to explain their action. The 
advantage of this paradigm is that it ailows one to ask diildren, who inconectly 
reply that their initial belief was that the box contained candles, the following 
action exvlanation question: "-et the DaDer then?" In doing so, 
the inconsistency between diildren's incorrect reality-based response (i.e., candles) 
and their p i o r  action (i.e., going to get the paper) is made hlly explicit (Le., the 
onlv wav to resolve this inconsistencv is to appeal to a false belief). In addition to 
ths crayon box trial, cluldren were given a second action trial that was 
conceptually identical to the first, but that involved a juice box that unexpectedly 
contained sand (juice box trial). Prior to discovering the true contents of the luice 
box, children were asked to get a cup so that they could drink some juice. 
One final unique feature of the design of this experiment was that 
children's understanding of false belief was assessed in two contexts that were 
familiar to them. That is, duldren are often asked to get paper to draw on or cups 
to drink out of. Consequentlv, it is likely that these actions carry special meanhg 
to children because they serve to highlight the respective goals of drawing a 
picture and d n n h g  some juice. In turn, discovering that these goals cannot be 
accomplished, because the crayon box unexpectedly contains candles, or the juice 
box unexpectedly contains sand, should hrther 
their action by appealing to their false belief. 
Thus, the main question that 1 addressed 
drive children to make sense of 
in Experiment 1 was how 3-year- 
old children, who are typically unable to reason in terms of false belief, would 
explain an action of theirs that was consistent with their false belief, but 
inconsistent with reality. 
Me thod 
Participants 
Participants included 63 children (30 boys, 33 girls; s e  rangg = 3;l-  3;11 
vears, mean age = 3;6). Eight additional children were excluded from this final 
sample for either refusing to state their initial belief about the contents of the box, 
or for being unable to complete the procedure due to hssiness or an unwillingness 
to speak. Children were predominantly from White middle-class families, and 
were recniited through advertisements in local malls, daycare centers, and other 
public centres. 
Ma terials 
Stimuli included a crayon box that contained candles, an orange juice box 
that contained sand, a sheet of 8 1/2 x 11 in white paper, and a green plastic cup. 
Desirin - and Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a laboratory playroom. Pnor to the 
testing session, a piece of paper and a cup were placed alongside a wail adjacent 
to the table where the child and the experimenter wouid be seated during the 
testing session. None of the children appeared to notice either of these items until 
each was pointed out to them at the appropriate time during the experimental 
protocol. The order of the two action trials (crayon box and juice box) was 
counterbalanced, such that half of the children received the crayon box first and 
the juice box second, and vice-versa. The procedure of these two trials preceding 
the administration of the test and control questions was very sirnilar, and was as 
Cravon box trial. Children were shown a crayon box and were asked to 
state what thev thought was inside. Once children had stated that they believed 
the box to contain crayons, the experimenter pointed out that there was a piece of 
paper on the floor, and suggested that they go get it to draw on with the crayons. 
After children had gone to get the paper and retumed to the table, they were 
shown that the crayon box actually contained candles. 
Juice box trial. Children were shown a juice box and were asked to state 
what they thought was inside. Once children had stated that they believed the box 
to contain juice, the experimenter pointed out that there was a cup on the floor, 
and suggested that they go get it so that they could drink some juice. After 
children had gone to get the cup and retumed to the table, they were shown that 
the juice box actually contained sand. In six cases, children unexpededly stated 
that they did not want to go get the cup because they were not thirsty.' These 
children were not included in the final sample (N = 63), as it was imperative to the 
design that children a d  on their false belief. 
Test and control auestions. In both trials, once children had seen the 
unexpected contents of the box, and the box had been dosed up, they were asked 
the following false belief question: "Before, when you first saw the box a l l  closed 
It is important to note that children's unwillingness to get the cup occurred equally often in Trial 
1 as in Trial 2. Thus, it was not the case that after having dixovered the unexpected contents of the 
box on Trial 1, children were hesitant to perfomi an action premiseâ on th& belief in Trial 2. 
up like this, what did vou think was inside?" If children responded 
"candles / sand," they were immediately as ked the following action exvianation 
question: "Whv did vou go get the paper/cup then?" For those children who 
correctly responded "crayons/juice," an ensuing realitv control question was 
asked: "What is inside the box?" This question was asked to ensure that children 
were indeed differentiating between their false belief and the true contents of the 
box. These children were then asked the following modified action explanation 
question, "Why did you go get the paper/cup?" The wording of this question was 
changed slightly for this group of children for pragmatic reasons. That is, these 
children were not being asked to resolve the inconsistency between an incorrect 
reality-based response and a ptior action, but rather, were being asked to sirnply 
recall why they had performed their action. In essence, the explanations of this 
group of children provided a cornparison to the explanations of the group of 
child ren who incorrectly answered the false belief question (see Appendix A for 
Experiment 1 Protocol). 
Coding 
Responses to the false belief question were considered to be correct if 
children stated both their initial beiief about the contents of the box, along with 
what was currently in the box (i.e., correctly answered the realitv control 
question). Al1 other responses were coded as incorrect. 
Following an initial inspection of the data, diildren's responses to the action 
exdanation question were classified into the following four categories: 
1. Pre-action: reference to a sta te which occurred p ior  to duldren 
performing the action. These states included: i) belief (e-g., because 1 
thou& it was crayons), ii) desire (e.g., because 1 wanted a drink), 
iii) goal (e.g.. for drawing), and iv) physical (e.g., "because 1 was 
thirsty ") 
2. Post-action: reference to a state which occurred after children had 
performed the action. Within this category, the only state that children 
appealed to was the true contents of the box (e.g., "because there was 
sand in there") -
3. Irrelevant: reference to an aspect of the situation that was not causally 
related to the child's action (e.g., "1 got the paper" or, "Where's the 
cup? ") 
4. No response: the no remonse category included instances in which the 
diild provided no response at all, or simply stated "1 don? know," or 
"because" 
Al1 of the children's explanations were independently coded by myself and 
by an undergraduate psychology student who was blind to the purpose of the 
study. Interrater agreement was 9674, Cohen's kappa = 0.95. Ail disagreements 
were resolved through discussion (see Appendix B for examples of diildren's 
explana fions). 
Results 
Across both trials, children awwered the false belief question correctly 50% 
of the tirne, and incorrectly 50% of the tirne. There were no instances in which a 
correct response to the false belief question was followed by an incorrect response 
to the realitv control question. Analyses of the data indicated that children's 
responses to the false belief question were not affected either by Trial order, 
McNemar jl' (1,62), p = -549, or by Trial type (i.e., crayon or juice box): Trial 1, 
(1,62) = .42, g = 3 6 ,  Trial 2 , ~ '  (1,62) = .75, g = .387 (see Table 1). 
Analyses of children's responses to the action exolanation question were 
broken down as a function of their performance on the preceding false belief 
question. Responses that were coded as were considered to have 
correctlv explained the child's action', whereas responses that were coded as post- 
action, irrelevant, and no resvonse were not. 
In those instances in which children passed the false belief question (1? = 
60)', 65% of their explanations were coded as pre-action, 5% as post-action, 10% as 
irrelevant, and 20% as no response. Among the pre-action explanations that 
children provided @ = 39), 15% appealed to a belief, 31% to a desire, 36% to a goal, 
and 18% to a physical state. 
In those instances in which children failed the false belief question & = 63), 
19% of their responses to the action ex~lanation question were coded as pre- 
action, 16% as post-action, 32% as irrelevant, and 33% as no response. Among the 
' Given that pre-action explanations were at times provided by chiidren who incorrectlv answered 
the false belief question, one could argue tha t oniy belief-reiated explana tions tnrly reflect 
children's understanding that their action was premised on a false belief. Although 1 agree that t h  
is the case, it is important to distinguish pre-action explanations from those that do not in any way 
explain why diildren performed the action that they did. 
Because the experimental protocol did not initially entail asking dllldren who gassed the faise 
belief question to explain their action, the total number of explanations provided in these cases was 
60, rather than 63. 
pre-action explanations that children provided (E = 12), 42% appealed to a belief, 
25% to a desire, 25% to a goal, and 8% to a physical state. 
Ln those instances in which the false belief question was answered correctly, 
children provided significantly more pre-action explanations than in those 
instances in which the false belief question was answered incorrectly: Trial 1,$ (1, 
62) = 6.22, p = -013, Trial 2, f (1,61) = 22.89, g < .001. 
Of the 63 children in the study, 41% passed the false belief question in both 
trials, 41% failed the false belief question in both trials, and 18% answered 
correctly in one trial and incorrectly in the other. Of this last group of children, 
four answered correctly on the first trial, but incorrectly on the second, whereas 
seven showed the opposite pattern. A breakdown of the action explanations for 
each of these 3 groups of children is shown in Figure 1. 
Overall, results indicate that in those instances in which the false belief 
question was answered incorrectly, diildren were rarely able to appeal to their 
false belief in response to the follow-up action exdanation question. 
Nonverbal aspects of children's responses 
During the coding of children's verbal responses to the false belief and 
action exvlanation questions, 1 noticed that there were nonverbal aspects of the 
duldrents responses that appeared to differ between these two questions. The 
difference between these two questions appeared to be especially marked in those 
instances in which children failed the false belief question. In these instances, 
children often responded to the false belief question quickly and with ease (albeit 
incorrectlv), whereas their responses to the action ex~lanation question appeared 
to be fraught with more uncertainty and/or hesitation. This difference did net 
appear to be as pronounced in those instances in which children passed the false 
belief question. To examine whether these differences did indeed exist, a coding 
scheme for nonverbal behaviours was developed. 
Coding Scheme. Children's responses to both the faise belief and action 
explanation questions were coded along the following three dimensions: 
1. Response latency. Response latency was measured from the t h e  the 
experimenter finished asking the test question to the time that the child uttered the 
iirst word of his/her response that was not an interactional marker, sudi as "uh," 
and "hmm." For example, if a child gave the following explanation: "uh, because 1 
wanted to draw," the timer was stopped at "because," and not "uh." Cases in 
which children failed to provide a verbal response were automatically assigned a 
latency time of 4 S. This procedure was only required for diildren's responses to 
the action explanation question, because there were no instances in which children 
failed to provide a response to the false belief question. A response latency of 4 s 
was chosen based on the finding that 97% (106/109) of al1 children's response 
latencies to the action ex~lanation question were 4 s or less.' Agreement between 
the two coders' response latencies for each question was assessed using 
correlations. The Pearson fs for response latencies to the false belief and action 
' The remaining three latency times to the action emlanation question were: 4.87,5.43, and 10.36 S. 
This last latency tirne was markedly longer than the others because the chiid's response contaïneci 
several interactional markers. The results of the analyses do not differ whether these three latency 
times are induded or not. 
exdanation questions ranged between r = 0.92 and 0.99, p < .O1 (mean 
disagreement < 0.15 s). 
2. Interactional markers and retracin~s. Interactional markers are defined as 
sounds that function as pauses (e.g., "uh"), or that reflect thinking/waiting ( e g ,  
"hmm") (MacWhinney, 1995). If children's responses contained one, or more, of 
these markers, a score of 1 was given; otherwise, a score of O was assigned. 
Retracings captured both direct repetitions and changes in wording.' Withui the 
latter, 1 distinguished between changes that involved (1) the contents of the box 
(e.g., because I thought there were candles, cravons in there), (2) a belief or 
knowledge state (e.g., because it was, 1 thounht it was juice), and (3) other (e-g., 
because there's, because 1 wanted to colour). Percent agreement for children's use 
of interactional marken and retrachgs was 99.5% and 99% respectively. Cohen's 
kappa for interactional rnarkers and retracings was 0.98 and 0.93 respectively. 
3. Behavioural reactions. Examining children's behavioural reactions was 
intended to capture those instances in which children overtly displayed 
uncertainty and/or hesitation in response to the test questions. Behaviours that 
were identified as reflecting such a characterization included: getting up and 
leaving the table where the child and the experimenter were seated, changing the 
topic, fidgeting, and gaze aversion (i.e., looking away, down, or around, 
immediately aher the test question was asked). If duldren's readion to the 
question included one, or more, of these behaviours, a score of 1 was @en, 
Although retracings are verbal devices, these were categorized as nonverbal, because their use 
was considered to reflect uncertallity and/or hesitation in the chiid, that was separable from the 
verbal meaning of the chiid's explanation. 
otherwise, a score of O was assigned. Percent agreement for behavioural reactions 
in response to the false belief and action exdanation questions was 96% and 89% 
respectivelv. Cohen's kappa for behavioural reactions to the false belief and action 
 ex^ lana tion questions was 0.82 and 0.77, respective1 y. 
Response latency, interactional markers and retracings, and behavioural 
reactions were coded in exactly the same manner for children's responses to both 
the false belief and action exvlanation questions. This in tum enabled me to 
directly compare the nonverbal aspects of children's responses to each of these 
two questions. 
Preliminarv Analyses. Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted on the sample as a whole. The two within-subjects factors entered into 
these analyses were Trial order (first or second), and Question type (false belief or 
action exdanation). The dependent measures of interest were response latency, 
interactional marken and retracings, and behavioural reactions. 
Resvonse latencv. The analysis of response latency revealed a significant 
main effect of Trial order, E(1,59) = 15.49, g c .001, and of Question type, E(1,59) = 
19.17, p < .001. Children responded significantly faster to both the false belief (M = 
.92, a = .75) and action exdanation (M = 1.56, = 1.51) questions on Trial 2 as 
compared to Trial 1 (false belief question, M = 1.39, = 1.13; action exvlanation 
question, M = 2.21, a = 1.28). Children also responded more quiddy to the false 
belief question, as compared to the action ex~lanation question. There was no 
Trial order x Question type interaction, E(1,59) = .42, p = S18. 
Interactional markers and retracings. The nurnber of interactional markers 
contained in children's responses was not significantly affected by Trial order, E(1, 
49) = 1 .O9, p = ,302, Question type, FJ 1,49) = 2.67, p = .log, or a Trial order x 
@estion type interaction, 1(1,49) = .05, g = ,821. There was however, a signihcant 
main effect of Question type on the number of retracings in diildrenls responses, 
F(1,49) = 10.60. p = .002. Children's responses to the action exdanation question - 
contained significantly more retracings than their responses to the false belief 
question. There was no main effect of Trial order, Hl, 49) = 1.32, g = 255, nor a 
Trial order x Question type interaction, E(1,49) = 1.32, g = 255. 
Behavioural reactions. Finally, there was a signifiant main effect of 
Question type on the number of behavioural reactions contained in diildren's 
responses, E(1 , 59) = 60.26, g < .001. Children's responses to the action ex~lanation 
question contained significantly more behavioural reactions than their responses 
to the false belief question. There was no main effect of Trial order, E(1,59) = -14, p 
= .709, nor a Trial order x Question type interaction, E(1,59) = .16, p = .687. 
Although an overall analysis of the data indicated that children's responses 
to the false belief and action exdanation questions differed significantly on several 
dimensions, 1 was interested in determinhg whether this same relationship would 
hold within various sub-groups of cases. I was particularly interested in whether 
the pa ttem that was observed with the sample as a whole, would be the same in 
those instances in which diildren passed the false belief question, as well as in 
those instances in which children failed the false belief question. 
Instances in which children failed the false belief question. 1 predicted that 
in these instances. children's responses to the action exdanation question would 
have longer latencies, contain more interactional markers and retracings, and 
contain more behavioural reactions reflecting uncertainty and/or hesitation, as 
compared to their responses to the false belief question. To provide a more 
detailed analysis of children's responses to these two questions, the data were 
examined separately for Trials 1 and 2. 
Remonse latencv. Differences in response latency were examined using a 
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Question type (false belief or action 
exdanation) as the withm-subjects factor. In both Trials 1 and 2, there was a main 
effect of Question type, F(1.32) = 10.59, g = ,003, and F(I, 29) = 6.78, g = .OIS. For 
both Trials 1 and 2, response latencies were significantly longer to the adion 
ex~lanation question, as  compared to the false belief question. Means and 
standard deviations for children's response latencies are shown in Table 2. 
Interactional markers and retracine - In general, children's responses did 
not often contain interactional markers and retracings. Across trials, the 
percentage of children's responses that contained interactional markers was 12% 
to the false belief question and 4% to the action ex~lanation question. Across trials, 
the percentage of children's responses that contained retracings was 2*/0 to the 
false belief question and 15% to the action ex~lanation question. Although 
retracings that involved either a mental state, or the contents of a box, were 
particularly interesting for theoretical reasons, as they signal that children are 
actively dianging their minds (e.g., because 1 thought there was sand, iuice in the 
box), these rarely occurred in the data. Indeed, these types of retracings never 
occurred in children's responses to the false belief question, and only occurred 
twice in their responses to the action exdanation question. 
To examine whether there were significant differences in children's use ot 
interactional markers and retracings in response to the false belief and action 
exdanation questions, McNemar 2 tests were conducted. The McNemar test is 
a nonparametnc test that is employed in a design with categorical data from two 
dependent sarnples (Sheskin, 1997). in Trial 1 there were no significant differences 
in children's use of either interactional markers, McNemar f (1.26)) p = 1.000, or 
retracings, McNemar 1' (1'26) g = .625, between the false belief and action 
exdanation questions. in Trial 2, this same pattern held for children's use of 
interactional markers, McNemar jl' (1,24), g = .375. However, it was not possible 
to conduct a McNemar 2 for children's use of retracings in Trial 2 because none of 
their responses to the false belief question contained any retracings, and so two of 
the cells in the contingency table were equal to zero. 
Behavioural Reactions. Children displayed signihcantly more behavioural 
reactions that were coded as reflecting uncertainty and /or hesitation in response 
to the action exolanation question than they did in response to the false belief 
question in both Trials 1 and 2, McNemar y' (1,32), p < .001, and McNemar 2 (1, 
29), g = .OOl, respectively. 
Instances in which children ~assed  the false belief ouestion and answered 
the adion emlanation auestion correctlv. The current set of analyses was 
restricted to those instances in which diildren passed the f a k  belief question and 
correc tlv responded to the action exolanation question (Q = 39). 1 predicted tha t in 
these instances, in contrast to what was found in those instances in which children 
failed the false belief question, response latency, interactional markers and 
retracings, and behavioural reactions would not differ significantly between 
children's responses to the hlse belief and action ex~lanation questions. 1 based 
tius prediction on the fact that, for diildren who answered the false belief question 
correctlv, asking them to explain their action did not highlight any inconsistenq 
in their reasoning. 
Note, however, that 1 did not include in these analyses instances in which 
children passed the false belief question, but were unable to provide a correct 
explanation for their action. My rationale for this choice was that, in these cases, 
the nature of children's understanding of false belief was unclear, given thai they 
appeared unable to correctly reason about an action of theirs that was premised on 
a false belief. Instead, these children may have been in a stage that has been 
labeled as " transitional" with respect to false belief understanding (Clements, 
Rustin, & McCallum, 2000). Indeed, these authors f o n d  that within a group of 
children who were given a change-in-location task, there was a subset who could 
correctly judge where the character would look for his object (eg., "Where is Maxi 
going to look?"), but were unable to justify their judgment (e.g., "Whv will he look 
there?"). Consequently, I chose to include as a cornparison only those instances in 
which children were able to correctly answer both the false belief and action 
 ex^ lana tion questions. 
In addition, the current set of analvses provided a control for the possibility 
that the longer response latencies to the action exvlanation question, as compared 
to the false belief question, that were observed in the previous analyses, were 
merely due to differences in sentence structure between these two questions, thus 
making the action exdanation question more difficult for diildren to mswer. For 
instance, it is arguable that the "why" format of the action exdanation question is 
an inherently difficult one for 3-year-old children to understand and thus may 
take them longer to answer than the false belief question. However, if this were 
the case, then one would expect a children to take significantly longer to respond 
to the action exdanation question as compared to the false belief question. 
Res~onse latencv. There were no significant differences in response latency 
between the false belief and action exvlanation questions for either Trial 1, F(1, 15) 
= 2.15, p = ,163, or Tria1 2, E(l,22) = 2.02. p = ,170. Response latency means and 
standard deviations are shown in Table 3. 
Interactional markers and retracins There were no significant differences 
in children's use of interactional markers for either Trial 1, McNemar r' (1,15), g = 
1.000, or Trial 2, McNemar f (1,22), p = 1.000, nor were there any significant 
differences in children's use of retracings for either Trial 1, McNemar f (1,15), p = 
,219, or Trial 2, McNemar f (1,22), p = 1.000. 
Behavioural reactions. There were significantly more behaviouel readions 
that were coded as reflecting uncertainty and/or hesitation in response to the 
action exvlanation question, as compared to the false belief question in Trial 1, 
McNemar ;l' (1,l5), p = .031. However, this difference was only marginally 
sigmficant in Trial 2, McNemar 1' (1,22), p = -063. 
Analvses between moum. The previous analyses established that response 
la tencies to the action exvlana tion question were significantiy longer than those to 
the false belief question in those instances in which children answered the fdse 
belief question incorrectly. In contrast, response latencies did not differ 
significantly between the false belief and action ex~lanation questions in those 
instances in which children answered both questions correctly. However, it was 
also important to establish that response latencies across these two groups were 
similar to the false belief question, yet differed to the action exdanation question. 
As expected, such analyses revealed that response latencies to the false belief 
question did not differ significantly between groups for either Trial 1, E(1,49) c 1, 
p = -985, or Trial 2, E(1,51) = .20, g = ,657. For the action ex~lanation question, 
response latencies did not differ significantly, for Trial 1, 1(1,49) = 2.07, E = .157, 
though the trend was in the predicted direction. In Trial 2, this difference was 
rnarginally sigmficant, Hl, 51) = 3.84, g = -056 (see Tables 2 and 3 for response 
latency means). Thus, although response latencies to the false belief question were 
virtually identical for both groups, these differed to the action emlanation 
question, significantly so in Trial 2. 
Discussion 
Verbal Responses 
in Experirnent 1, my goal was to determine whether chîldren who respond 
incorrectly to a standard false belief question, might nevertheless appeal to their 
false belief if questioned about w h ~  they had performed an action that was 
premised on this belief. Results indicate that this was rarely the case. In those 
instances in which children incorrectly answered the false belief question, only 8% 
of their ensuing explanations made an ex~licit reference to their false belief. This 
t'inding supports previous results by Moses and Flavell(1990), Wimmer and 
Weichbold (1994), and Wimmer and Mayringer (1998). 
However, what these previous studies did not address was how drildren 
explained their own misguided action. Although proponents of the theory-theory 
view argue that an understanding of the various aspects of mind should not 
emerge earlier with respect to self than with respect to others (e.g., Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991), such a hypothesis has never been tested in the realm of action 
explanation. Yet, intuitively, there is reason to believe that the actions and goals of 
the self should be more salient than those of others, and thus easier to make sense 
of. This view is nicely echoed in the following statement by Riggs and Robinson 
(199%): " . . .duldren may have heightened awareness of their own intentions 
relative to those of other people and that this may mark an important difference 
between duldren's reasoning about own and others' minds" (p. 283). In addition, 
having children act on their own false belief aeated a very clear inconsistency 
between what children incorrectly stated as their initial belief (i.e., candles/sand), 
and their earlier action (i.e., getting paperkup), that could only be resolved by 
invoking a false belief. Nevertheless, the results of Experiment 1 clearly show that 
children were unable to appeal to their prior false belief to explain their action. 
This finding supports the clairn that 3-year-old children may indeed suffer from a 
conceptual deficit in their understanding of false belief. 1 will retum to a more 
detailed treatment of this issue in the General Discussion. 
Nonverbal aspects of chilciren's resvonses 
The rnethodology of Experiment 1 involved asking duldren both to report 
an earlier belief about the contents of a box, as well as to explain an action of theirs 
that was premised on this earlier belief. As a result, it was possible to compare 
nonverbal aspects of children's responses to each of these two questions. The 
results of this cornparison revealed an interestirtg pattern. Specifically, children 
who incorrectly answered the false belief question tended to do so quickly and 
easily, while their response to the ensuing action emlanation question tended to 
reflect more uncertainty and hesitation, as evidenced primarily by response 
tatencv and behavioural reaction measures. 
An explanation that 1 propose for this finding draws upon the notion of 
cognitive dissonance. In the adult literahire, cognitive dissonance is defined as 
those instances in whch we are aware that our thoughts and actions do not 
coincide (Myers, 1995). As a result, we experience tension, or, in other words, 
dissonance. It may not be that 3-year-old diildren are explicitly representing the 
following, "If 1 thought that there were candles in the box, why did 1 go get the 
paperl" However, it  is possible that a t  an implicit level, children are beginning to 
detect the inconsistency between their incorrect reality-based response (e.g., 
candles) and their prior action, which is reflected in a response pattern that is 
characterized by uncertainty and/or hesitation. The fact that the false belief 
question does not explicitly set up this same inconsistency might account for why 
a similar response pattern is not obsewed for this question. 
A second, alternative, hypothesis is that the obsewed response pattern to 
the action exdanation question was due to the fact that children had cornmitted 
themselves to an incorrect response to the false belief question (e.g., "candles), in 
tum precluding the possibility of a correct response (e.g., "because I thought it 
was crayons") to the action exdanation question. That is, after having denied, or 
iailed to acknowledge, their prior false belief, it may have been difficult for 
children to then appeal to this belief to explain their action. According to this 
argument, children's uncertainty and/or hesitation in answering the action 
exdanation question merely reflected the fact that they did not have an answer 
that was readily available. If this were the case, then there would be no need to 
diaracterize children as experiencing cognitive dissonance. 
Although 1 cannot fully rule out this hypothesis, there are two reasons why 
1 believe that it is less likely than the "dissonance hypothesis." First, it is not clear 
that an incorrect response to the false belief question predudes a correct response 
to the action exdanation question. Whereas the false belief question provides no 
context for recall (i.e., children are simply asked to retrîeve their initial belief), the 
action explanation question reminds children about an earlier action of theirs that 
was premised on this belief. Thus, it is possible that a child may answer the false 
belief question incorrectly, yet, after having been reminded about her past action, 
be able to retrieve her false belief to explain this action. Indeed, part of the 
rationale for the action exdanation question was to draw children's attention to 
their prior action to facilitate the retrieval of their prior belief. 
Second, the fact that, in many cases, children did not have a response that 
was readily available (Le., they took longer to answer the action ex~lanation 
question), may in fact support the dissonance hypothesis. Because 3-year-old 
children have a firm grasp of desires and goals, it would seem that, in the absence 
of an understanding of false belief, they should be able to appeal to such concepts 
as an explanation for their action (e.g., Because 1 wanted to draw). The fact that 
children did not always readily provide such explanations, however, suggests that 
the action expianotion question may have led hem to begin to detect the 
inconsistency between their incorrect reality-based response (e.g., candles) and 
their prior action. Indeed, such an inconsistency can only be resolved by appealing 
to a false belief, and not to a desire or to a goal. This codd perhaps explain why 
these children were "stuck" for a response; that is, they may have recognized that 
a desire- or goal-based explanation was unsatisfactory, yet a satisfactory belief- 
based explanation may not yet have been within their grasp. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that the differences in response 
latency to the false belief and action ex~lanation questions cannot be M y  
explained by arguing that the action exvlanation question is an inherently more 
difficult one for children to answer than the false belief question. Specifically, my 
thrd set of analyses indicated that there were no significant differences between 
children's response latencies to the false belief and action ex~lanation questions in 
those instances in which diildren answered both of these questions correctly. 
Although in these instances, children's responses to the action ex~lanation 
question also tended to be diaracterized b y more behavioural reactions reflecting 
uncertainty and/or hesitation, as compared to their responses to the false beiief 
question, this difference was not as marked as it was in those instances in which 
children failed the false belief question. 
Finally, across the sample as a whole, children responded to the false belief 
and action explanation questions sigmficantly more quickly in Trial 2, as 
compared to Trial 1. However, this did not affect the relative differences in 
response latency that were observed between the action ex~lanation and the false 
belief questions. hterestingiy, these shorter response latencies to both the fake -
belief and action exdanation questions in Trial 2, did not result in significantly -
more correct responses to either of these two questions [false belief question: 
McNemar (1,62), g = S49; action exdanation question: McNemar y' (1,59), p = 
.W). 
The results of Experirnent 1 revealed that having children act on a false 
beliei did not necessarily lead them to retneve their false belief when asked to 
explain their action. However, might it be the case that giving children a task 
which provided them with even more evidence of their false belief would enhance 
their retrieval ability? This issue relates to the debate about whether diildren's 
failure to retrieve a false belief reflects a conceptual deficit (i.e., children lack the 
understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality), or whether there exist 
factors, unrelated to children's understanding of false belief, that might prevent 
them from retrieving a false belief. In one such account, the "reality-masking" 
hypothesis, children's difficulty in acknowledging a false belief is athibuted to 
their inabilitv to ignore what is currently true in the world (eg., There are really 
candles in the box). Such a "reality bias" may in tum mask any early insight into 
the mind that diildren might possess (Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; Freeman & 
Lacohée, 1995; Freeman, Lacohée, & Coulton, 1995; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995; 
Saltmarsh, Mitchell, & Robinson, 1995; Saltmarsh & Mitchell, 1998; 1999). 
According to the conceptual deficit account, regardless of how faalitative a 
retrieval context might be, diildren will be unable to retrieve their false belief 
because " false belief" is not a notion that exists in their conceptual lexicon. In 
contrast, according to the "reality-masking" hypothesis, if the salience of a child's 
false belief can be heightened, then it is more likely that he, or she, will succeed in 
retrieving it. 
One of the first studies to provide support for the reality-maskmg 
hypothesis was conducted by Mitchell and Lacohée (1991). In this study, duldren 
were given a standard unexpected contents task with the following modification. 
Once children had stated their initial belief about the contents of a Smarties box, 
for instance, they were shown a series of picture cards, and were asked to find the 
card that depicted Smarties. Children were then asked to "mail" this card through 
a siot in a mail-box. After doing so, children were asked the following false belief 
question: "When vou posted your picture in the postbox, what did you think was 
in here?" Comparing children's performance on this task with one in which an 
irrelevant picture card (e.g., animal) was mailed, revealed a substantial difference 
in performance. Children were successful in retrieving their false belief 71% of the 
time when they mailed a picture of Smarties and only 36% of the time when they 
mailed an irrelevant picture card. The authors argued that because children's 
initial belief was given a physical counterpart (i.e., the picture of Smarties that 
they mailed) its salience was increased, thus allowing children to rehieve it. 
An important aspect of the reality-masking hypothesis is that the marner in 
which a child's false belief is made more salient need not necessarily involve a 
concrete object, but can also take the form of an action. For instance, the results of 
the Robinson and Mitchell (1995) study discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, 
have been used to support the notion that a character's misguided action (e.g., 
going to the wrong location to search for an object) c m  also serve the role of 
heightening the salience of a false belief. Recall that in Robinson and Mitchell's 
(1995) study, children heard a story about two identically dressed twins, one of 
whom was absent when the location of the ball that he had been playing with was 
moved. The authors found that 3-year-old children were below chance level when 
asked to predict where the "absent twin" would look for his bail. However, 
children were above chance level when asked an explanation question about 
whether the twin who went to the wrong location to search for his ball, was the 
twin who had been outside (or inside) when the ball was moved. The authors 
argued that, in this case, the twin's wrong search served as a physical counterpart 
to his false belief, thus resulting in an increase in the children's performance. 
However, given the objections that Pemer (1995) has raised with respect to the 
methodology of the Robinson and Mitchell (1995) study, combined with the 
findings from Riggs and Robinson (1995a) (where an action cue did not 
necessarily lead children to retrieve their false belief), it remains unclear whether it 
is indeed the case that acting on a false belief enhances children's ability to retrieve 
their belief. 
To determine whether this might be the case, Experirnent 2 involved 
c o m p a ~ g  children's performance on the action task to their performance on a 
standard unexpected contents task. In addition, I devised a third task that was 
intended to provide children with increased evidence of their false belief (thus 
making their belief more salient). In this task, referred to as the -n
task, chldren were first asked to plan what they would do with the expected 
contents of the box, and were then asked to act on their false belief. For example, 
in the crayon box version of this task, children were asked what they intended to 
draw, and what colour they intended to use. Children then went to get the paper. 
In sum, children were given the following three false belief tasks: (1) 
standard (unexpected contents), (2) action, and (3) plamine: - + action. My 
prediction was that children would retrieve their belief most often in the planning 
+ action task, and least often in the standard task. In addition, in the planning+ 
action and the action tasks, 1 was interested in obtaining children's exphnations 
for why they had performed their action. Recall that the logic in Experiment 1 was 
that children who incorrectly answered the false belief question might 
nevertheless appeal to their false belief when asked to explain their action. This is 
because, in this case, children's action (e.g., getting paper to draw on) is only 
consistent with their false belief (e.g., crayons) and not with reality (e.g., candles). 
Although the results of Experiment 1 did not support this finding (but see results 
from the analyses of the nonverbal aspects oi children's responses), it  is possible 
that providing children with increased evidence of their false belief, as with the 
planning + action task, may make the resulting inconsistency stronger, thus 
allowing children to retrieve their false belief to explain their action. in ths case, it 
is not only children's action that is inconsistent with reality (as is the case in the 
action task), but also children's plan for what they would have done with the 
contents of the box. As such, it is possible that children wiil appeal to their false 
belief more often when asked to explain their action in the plannine + action task, 
as  compared to the action task. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 48 children, 18 bovs, 30 girls, age r a n g  = 3;l - 3;11 
years, mean age = 3;s. Seven additional children were excluded from the sample 
for either failing to state iheir initial belief about the contents of one of the boxes (4 
children), not wanting to get the cup in a juice box trial (2 children), and 
experimenter error (1 child). However, because I was interested in determinhg 
children's relative performance across each of the three tasks, only those children 
who failed at least one of the tasks were included in the final sample. Twenty-four 
children fit this criterion, 9 boys, 15 girls, = 3;l- 3;11 years, mean age = 3;5. 
Al1 children were predominantly from White middleclass families and were 
recruited from the University of Waterloo Early Childhood Education Centre and 
a local Daycare. 
Ma terials 
The materials in this experiment included three boxes with unexpected 
contents - a crayon box that contained candles, a juice box that contained sand, 
and a Çmarties box that contained string - and three objects that the children were 
asked to retrieve - a piece of paper to draw on with the crayons, a cup to drink 
the juice out of, and a bowl to put the Smarties in. 
Design and Procedure 
Childreri were tested individuallv in a quiet area in their respective 
Centre/Daycare. To reduce any carry-over effects, duldren were tested during 
two separate sessions that were no less than two days apart (e.g., Monday and 
Wednesday). The number of days intervening between the two sessions ranged 
from 2-9 (the tirne between sessions was detennined by the child's schedule). 
Children were always given the planning - + action and action tasks together in 
counterbalanced order during one session, and the standard task during the other. 
The order of these two sessions was counterbalanced, such that half the children 
were given the plannine - + action and action tasks first and the standard task 
second, and vice versa. In addition, the type of box was counterbalanced for eadi 
task, such that any box x task combination was possible. Children always received 
a different type of box for each of the three tasks (i.e., a child was never given the 
same box twice). The procedure of the tasks was as follows: 
Standard. Children were shown one of the three boxes and were asked to 
state what they thought was inside. Children were then shown the unexpected 
contents of the box. The box was closed up and diildren were asked the false 
belief question, "Before, when you first saw the box al1 closed up like this, what -
did you think was inside?" Children who answered corredy were then asked the 
realitv control question, "What is inside the box?" 
Action. The procedure for the crayon and juice boxes was identical to the 
procedure in Experiment 1. For the Smarties box, diildren were asked to get a 
bowl to put the Smarties in. Recail that for those children who answered the false 
belief question incorrectlv, the action exdanation question ("Why did you go get 
the bowl then?") was asked immediately aftenvards. For those children who 
answered the false belief question correctly, the realitv control question ("What is 
inside the box?") was asked, followed bv the modified action exdanation question 
("Why did you go get the bowl?"). 
Plamine: + Action. The procedure for this task was identical to the 
procedure for the action task with the following exception: Pnor to being asked to 
perform an action, children were asked to plan what they would do with the 
ex~ected contents of the box. For the crayon box, chîldren were asked "What are 
vou going to draw?" and "What colour are you going to use to draw X?" For the 
juice box, children were asked "Can you show me how much you're going to 
drink?" (by pointhg with their finger to the level on the box corresponding to 
how much they would dnnk), and "How many sips are you going to take?" 
Finally, for the Smarties box, children were asked "How many are you going to 
eat?" and " M a t  colour are you going to eat first?" The administration of the test 
questions in this task was identical to their administration in the action task. 
C- The verbal coding procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that 
of Experiment 1. Inter-rater agreement for children's explanations was 100%. 
Results 
False belief auestions 
Children's responses to the false belief questions did not differ signihcantly 
as a function of task order: -+on, II' (1,23) = 1.34, p = ,247, action, X'
(1.23) = .06, g = ,813, and standard, f (1,23) = .60, p = .439 (see Table 4). 
Of particular interest was whether children's performance on the false 
belief questions differed as a tünction of task type. To address this issue, 
McNemar X' tests were carried out. A one-tailed significance level was adopted for 
these tests because speci fic predictions about the children's performance had been 
made (e.g., children will answer the false belief question correctly significantly 
more often in the planning + action task, as compared to the standard task). 
Analyses indica ted that, as predicted, children answered the false belief 
question correctly significantly more often in the planning + action task, as 
compared to the standard task, McNemar (corrected, 1,23), p = .032. There 
were no other significant task differences that emerged. Overall, children 
answered the false belief question correctly 33% of the time in the p l a ~ h e  
action task, 25% of the time in the action task, and 12.Soh of the time in the 
standard task (see Figure 2). 
Of the 24 children in the sample, 12 answered the false belief questions 
incorrectly across al1 three tasks. The pattern for the remairhg 12 children was as 
follows: four answered the false belief question correctly in the action task only, 
three answered the false belief question correctly in the planning + action task 
only, three answered the false belief question correctly in both the standard and 
planning + action tasks, and finallv, two answered the false belief question 
correctly in both the action and plannine + action tasks (see Table 5). Interestingly, 
it was never the case that children answered the false belief question correctly in 
the standard task, without also doing so in the plannina + action task. 
In three cases children responded to the false belief question correctly, but 
were unable to state what was currently inside the box (i.e., provided an incorrect 
response to the reality control question). These three cases were coded as incorrect 
responses to the false belief question. 
Action expianation questions 
Because children did not perform an action in the standard task, the 
following analyses are with respect to the action and plannine + action tasks only. 
Recall from Experiment 1 that childreds explanations were coded into four 
categories: (1) pre-action, (2) post-action, (3) irrelevant, and (4) no respowe. Once 
again, diildren's explanations were broken down as a function of their 
performance on the preceding false belief question (see Table 6). 
In those instances in which diildren answered the false belief question 
incorrectly in the action task = 18), 3 (17%) of their explanations were coded as 
pre-action, 7 (3g0I0j as post-action, 4 (î2%) as irrelevant, and 4 (22%) as no 
response. Within the pre-action category, children either made reference to a goal, 
or to a physicai state (e.g., there was crayons on here [painting to the crayon box]). 
In those instances in which diildren answered the false belief question correctly (IJ
= 6) ,  3 (50%) of their explanations were coded as pre-action, 1 (17O/0) as irrelevant, 
and 2 (33%) as no response. None of children's explanations were coded as post- 
action. Within the pre-action category, there was one reference to false belief, one 
reference to a goal, and one reference to a physical state. 
In those instances in which children answered the false belief question 
incorrectly in the planning + action task (n = 16), 3 (19%) of their explanations 
were coded as pre-action, 3 (19%) as post-action, 3 (1970) as irrelevant, and 7 (43%) 
as no response. None of children's pre-action expianations made appeal to a false 
belief, or to a desire. Rather, in two cases children made reference to their goal 
(e.g., to put the Smarties in), and in one case, to a physical state. In those cases in 
which children correctly answered the false belief question @ = 8), 3 (37.5%) of 
their explanations were coded as pre-action, 1 (12.5%) as post-action, and 4 (50%) 
as no response. Once again, children's pre-action explanations did not include 
reference to a false belief, or to a desire, but rather, inciuded reference to either a 
goal or to a physical state . 
There were no significant differences in the nurnber of pre-action 
explanations that duldren provided in the planning - + action task, versus the 
action task, McNemar jl' (1,23), g = 1.00. 
Discussion 
As predicted, children's performance on the planning + action task was 
signihcantly better than their performance on the standard task. However, my 
predictions that diildren's performance on the action task would be sigiuficantly 
better than their performance on the standard task, and likewise, that their 
performance on the plamine + action task would be significantly better than their 
performance on the action task, were not confirmed. Also, it was not the case that 
the planning + action task led children to explain their action correctly 
significantly more often than in the action task. I will begin by discussing what 
might account for the significant difference between children's performance on the 
lalse belief question in the plannine + action task and their performance on the 
false belief question in the standard task. 
First, a t  a general level, this finding is consistent with the reality-masking 
hypothesis discussed earlier. indeed, in the plannine + action task, it is Iikely that 
having children act, as well as plan, on the basis of their false belief made this 
belief very salient to them. However, one wonders whether a more specific 
argument can be made about how the plamine + action task served to make 
children's belief more salient. Although one of the me& of the reality-masking 
hypothesis may indeed be its generality, an accompanying drawback is that little 
is said about any specific processes that mav be involved, above and beyond the 
manipulations succeeding because they increase the salience of diildren's belief. 
Thus, it is perhaps worthwhile to briefly outline the manipulations employed in 
these previous studies, and then to discuss how these may have differed in an 
important way from the plannine + action manipulation in this shidy. 
Recall that in the Mitchell and Lacohée (1991) study, (as well as Freernan et 
al. (19951 and Freernan & Lacohée [1995]), children's initial belief was made more 
salient by giving Mdren a pictue of Smarties to mail. The authors conduded that 
the picture of Smarties served as a cue to the child's belief, thus allowing for 
successful retrieval: " . . .the cues we provided . . .enable 3-year-olds to succeed by 
direct recall instead of inferential reconstruction" (Freeman & Lacohée, 1995, p. 
56). In Mitchell and Lacohée's study, children (mean age = 3;6) were correct 71% of 
the time in the mailing condition, compared to 14% of the time in a standard 
unexpec ted contents condition. 
Al though similar theoretically , the manipulation tha t Saltmarsh et al. (1995) 
and Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1998) employed was quite different. Children were 
given what was termed a false belief state change task (adapted from the state 
change - task developed by Wimmer & Hart1 [1991]). In this task, both the child and 
a puppet were shown a Smarties box, and both were asked to state what they 
thought was inside. After the child and the puppet had stated "Smarties," and 
prior to the contents of the box being revealed, the puppet left to take a nap. At 
this point, in contrast to the procedure in a standard unexpected contents task, the 
children were shown that the box did indeed contain Smarties. This manipulation 
was, of course, intended to make diildren's belief more salient. Then, with the 
child watching, the experimenter exchanged the Smarties for an atypical content 
(e.g., pencils). Thus, only the puppet, but not the child, now held a faise belief 
about the contents of the box. To determine whether children could aduiowledge 
the puppet's false belief, they were asked the following (false belief) question 
"What does Puppet think is inside the box now?" Children's performance on this 
task was compared to their performance on a standard unexpected contents task. 
Results frorn both the Saltmarsh et al. (1995) and Saltmarsh and Mitchell 
(1998) studies indica ted that children answered the false belief question correctly 
significantlv more often in the false belief state change task, as compared to the 
standard unexpected contents task. Specifically, in Saltmarsh et al. (1995), children 
(rnean age = 3;s) were correct 47?& of the time in the false belief state change task, 
as compared to 24% of the tirne in the standard unexpected contents task. These 
numbers were comparable to those in the Saltmarsh and Mitchell (1998) study. 
Here, children (mean age = 3;11) were successful58% of the tirne in the false belief 
state change task, and 29% of the time in the standard unexpected contents task. In 
each of these studies, the authors argued that "presenting a physical instantiation 
of a false belief helps children to a small but reliable extent to correctly report that 
beliet'" (Saltmarsh & Mitchell, 1998, p. 3). 
Finally, in Saltmarsh & Mitchell (1999), children were videotaped while 
being administered the standard unexpected contents task. The videotaping began 
when the experimenter first showed children the box, and was stopped 
immediately after the children had uttered their initial belief about the contents of 
the box. The rest of the task proceeded in the typical manner, up until the 
administration of the false belief question. At that point, children were shown the 
videotape of themselves uttering their initial belief about the contents of the box 
and, only after seeing the videotape, were asked the false belief test question. 
Results indicated that children (mean age = 4;O) answered the false belief question 
correctly sigruficantly more often in the standard unex~ected contents task + 
video ~lavback (62'10) than in the standard unex~ected contents task (21%). The 
authors interpreted this tinding as follows: " . . .the video procedure makes 
children's initial belief more salient, thus reducing the need to reconstruct the 
premises upon which the false belief will be based" (p. 145). 
What is common to al1 of the studies just described, is that the performance 
of 3-year-old children, who are typically unable to retrieve a false belief, was 
significantly enhanced. Consequently, based on these findings, an important claim 
has been substantiated: in a standard unexpected contents task, the child's false 
belief (e.g., crayons) is not simply updated by the true contents of the box (e.g., 
candles) and lost, but rather, under the right conditions, can be retrieved. This, in 
itself, is an important contribution to the false belief literature. 
What is less clear from this research, however, is the process involved in 
children's successful retrieval of their belief. For instance, it could be argued that 
the manipulations in these studies lacked "real-world" relevance, or "ecological 
validity." Indeed, how often are children videotaped while uttering an initial 
belief about the contents of a box, or asked to mail a picture depicting their belief 
about the contents of the box? As such, it is unclear what insight about false belief 
children in these shidies rnay have had dunng the retrieval process. 
In contrast, it is arguable that the plannine + action manipulation in 
Experiment 2 made children's belief more relevant, and in the process more 
salient, because it involved goals that young children are familiar with (e.g., 
drawing a pichire). As such, I would argue that the planning + action 
manipulation was one that was ecologically valid. That is, this task may provide a 
context in which children become aware of the relevance of past beliefs to explain 
past behaviour. For instance, successful belief retrieval in the planning + action 
task may have involved children coming to the realitation that, because they had 
just gone to get a piece of paper (action), and had intended to draw a blue 
snowman (plan), their earlier belief was necessarily that the box contained 
crayons. In contrast, it is unclear whether the manipulations in the "reality- 
mashg"  studies provided children with a similar sort of insight. 
It is important to acknowledge that the difference in magnitude between 
children's correct performance in the plannine + action task (33%), and their 
correct performance in the standard task (12.5%) was not quite as  large as some 
reported in the studies discussed above. However, it is important to point out that 
the mean age of the children in Experiment 2 was slightly younger (3;5 yeaa) than 
in these studies, and thus may have accounted for the relatively smaller difference 
in magnitude that was observed. One notable exception, however, is the Mitchell 
and Lacohée (1991) study, in which children's mean age was 3;6 years. In this 
study, the magnitude of the increase in duldren's performance in the mailing task, 
as compared to the standard task, was 54%. Although merely speculative, it is 
possible that this substantial difference in performance was in part due to the 
temporally explicit wording of the false belief test question. Rather than asking 
children a standard false belief question (e.g., Before when you first saw the box 
al1 closed up like this, what did you think was inside?), Mitchell and Lacohée 
(1991) asked children the following: "When you posted your picture in the post 
box, what did you think was inside?" Although, in Experiments 1 and 2,1 
contemplated asking children, "When you went to get the paper, what did you 
think was inside the box?" 1 decided against this wording because 1 was worried 
that a portion of children's correct responses to the false belief question might 
reflect an associative bias ( e g ,  "paper" might automatically cue "crayons"), rather 
than genuine false belief retrieval. 
Finally, my prediction that children might explain their action by appealing 
to a false belief in the planninr! + action task more often than in the action task was 
not confirmed. Indeed, perhaps the most striking finding from both Experiments 1 
and 2 was children's inability to appeal to a false belief to explain their action. And 
so, it is this specific issue that 1 turn to first in the General Discussion. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
I began this thesis by asking the following question: Will asking children to 
perform an action premised on their false belief allow them to retrieve this belief, 
when asked to explain their action? The results from both Experiments 1 and 2 
revealed that this was rarely the case. In those instances in whidi diildren 
responded incorrectly to the false belief question in Experiment 1, only 8% of their 
ensuing responseç to the action exrilanation question included reference to a false 
belief. Ln Experiment 2, children's incorrect responses to the false belief question 
were never followed by a response to the action exvlanation question that 
included reference to a false belief. 
Researchers who ascribe to the theory-theory view of development have 
argued about the importance of counter-evidence in promoting theory change. 
According to this view, one mechanism that is hypothesized to contribute to the 
shift from an incomplete (or incorrect) theory, to one that is complete (or correct), 
is an accumulation of counter-evidence to the initial theory. Moreover, it is argued 
that the beginnhgs of such a shift are apparent when counter-evidence to an 
incomplete theory is especially salient (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Gopnik, 1996a; 
Gopnik, Slaughter, & Meltzoff, 1994). In this account, the relationship between 
counter-evidence and tleory change is viewed as progressing through the 
following steps: (1) counter-evidence may initially be treated as "noise," and thus 
is largely ignored or discounted, (2) ad-hoc auxiliary hypotheses are developed to 
account for particularlv salient instances of counter-evidence, and hally,  (3) an 
aitemative mode1 tu the original theory is developed. 
The notion of counter-evidence is relevant to both Experiments 1 and 2 of 
the current thesis. Specifically, in Experiment 1, children acted on their belief in a 
goal-directed fashion. Thus, the action that children performed, provided them 
with evidence of their false belief, Children were then reminded of this evidence 
when asked to explain why they had performed their action. Stated altematively, 
this task provided children with counter-evidence to a theory of belief whch does 
not incorporate the notion that beliefs can be false. in Experiment 2, children were 
similarly exposed to counter-evidence by being questioned about their false belief 
after having planned, and then acted, on the basis of this belief. Was there any 
indication that children were aware of the counter-evidence that was provided to 
them in both Experiments 1 and 2? 
The effects of counter-evidence in Ex~eriment 1 
Because 3-year-olds generally do not have a firm grasp that the mind can 
misrepresent reality, their responses to a standard false belief question tend to 
incorrectly appeal to current reality (e-g., candles), rather than to their earlier belief 
(e.g., crayons). In this case, diildren's "reality bias" is likely heightened because 
the structure of the standard false belief question does not motivate dllldren, who 
lack an understanding of false belief, to contemplate their answer prior to 
providing it. Couched in the language of the theory-theory, the fake belief 
question does not provide children with any counter-evidence to th& incorrect 
theorv of belief. Rather, children can quickly respond to this question by appealing 
to the current contents of the box, without ever becoming aware that their 
reasoning is faultv. in contrast, the results of Experiment 1 indicated that this 
process differed when these same children were asked to explain an action of 
theirs that was premised, not on reality, but on their false belief. Although a 
majoritv of the children's responses were also incorrect, they were not 
characterized by this same reality bias. 
Perhaps this argument is best illustrated as foliows. A majority of the 
children who failed the false belief question in Experiment 1 tended to state quite 
confidently what was currently in the box (e.g., "candles/sand"). One would 
expect this same reality bias to reappear in children's ensuing responses to the 
action ex~lanation question. That is, one would expect chiidren to answer the 
action exdanation question by stating, for instance, "because there were candles 
in the box." However, children displayed such a reality bias only 16% of the time 
in their responses to the action ex~lanation question (i.e., only 16% of children's 
responses were coded as post-action). This finding suggests that diildren were 
processing the false belief and action ex~lanation questions quite differently. 
More specifically, as 1 stated in the discussion section for Experiment 1,1 
suggest that the action ex~lanation question may have triggered the followhg 
type of processing in the children (though perhaps not formulated quite so 
explicitlv): "If 1 thought that there were candles in the box, why did 1 go get the 
paper?" As such, 1 would argue that drawîng children's attention to an earlier 
action of theirs that can oniy be explained in terms of their false belief provides 
them with counter-evidence that strongly challenges a theory of belief that is 
incomplete (i.e., one that does not include the notion of false belief). 
Although it was not the case that such counter-evidence was successful in 
leading a majority of the children to appeal to a belief when asked to explain their 
action, nonverbal aspects of children's responses suggested that this counter- 
evidence was not altogether ignored either. For instance, in Experirnent 1, a 
cornparison between the false belief and action exdanation questions, in those 
instances in which children answered the false belief question incorrectly, revealed 
that the action exdanation question took children sigmficantly longer to respond 
to than the false belief question. 
The results of Experiment 1 are relevant to how Gopnik and her coileagues 
have characterized the progressive relationship between counter-evidence and 
theory change. Recall that at the first level, children are described as often ignoring 
counter-evidence. The children in Experiment 1 who explained their action by 
appealing to reality (e.g., "because there was sand in there") could be 
characterized in this marner. 
At the second level, diildren are described as developing "ad-hoc auxiliary 
hypotheses" to account for particularly salient instances of counter-evidence. This 
level would correspond with the few instances in Experiment 1 in which children 
answered the faaise belief question incorrectly (e.g., "candles"), but who then 
appealed to their false belief to explain their action (e.g., "because I thought it was 
a ayons"). 
Finally, at level3, duldren are said to develop an alternative theory to their 
incorrect, or incomplete, original one. The children in Experiment 1 who were able 
to both correctly retrieve their belief, and correctly explain their action would be 
characterized at t h  level. 
However, one important transitional phase that 1 propose is lacking in the 
levels of change that Gopnik and her colleagues have formulated, may occur 
between levels 1 and 2. This stage would characterize a number of the children in 
Experiment 1 who did not ignore the counter-evidence (as was clear from the 
nonverbal aspects of their responses), but for w hom developing auxiliary 
hypotheses to account for this counter-evidence was not yet within their grasp. 
interestingly, it may only be possible to identify such children by examining 
nonverbal aspects of their responses. 
To my knowledge, nonverbal aspects have not been examined in previous 
studies of children's explanations of misguided actions. However, this method has 
the potential to contribute much needed information to how children begin to 
develop an awareness that false beliefs can sometimes lie at the root of actions. 
hterestingly, there is one study that has examined an aspect of diildren's 
nonverbal responses in a change-in-location task (Clements & Pemer, 1994). 
Results indicated that a substantial sub-set of children, between the ages of 2;11 
and 4;6, who incorrectly predicted the location where a character with a false 
belief would search for his object, nevertheless displayed eye gaze to the correct 
location. The authors argued that the children's correct eye gaze was reflective of 
an  implicit knowledge or, "knowledge that is unverbalizable," of false belief 
(Clements & Pemer, 1994). 
Finally, Slaughter and Gopnik (1996) have reported informal observations 
of children's behaviour when faced with counter-evidence, tha t are consistent with 
how 1 have characterized children's reactions to the action exdanation question in 
Experiment 1. In their study, 3-year-old children, who did not pass a standard 
false belief task, were given training on the concept of belief, and were provided 
with feedback on their performance. For instance, in one of the training tasks 
children were shown some golf balls and were asked "What do you thllik these 
things are?" Once children had stated "golf balls" it was revealed that the golf 
balls were really soap. Children were then asked a standard false belief question 
("When you first saw these things, what did you think they were then?"). If 
children answered incorrectly, they were told "No you didn't, you thought they 
were golf balls." The authos noted that although some of the children tended to 
ignore this contradictory feedback, others appeared taken aback and even shocked 
upon receiving it. 
Interestingly then, from a developrnental perspective, early evidence of 
children's shift from what can be characterized as a non-representational, to a 
representational, understanding of belief may first be apparent in the nonverbal, 
rather than the verbal, realm. 
The effects of counter-evidence in Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, children were given the following three false belief tasks: 
standard, action, and p lamine + action. I hypothesized that children's false belief 
would be encoded at the deepest level in the plannine + action task, in which 
children planned, and then acted, on the basis of their false belief, and at the 
lowest level in the standard task, in which no belief-based planning or action were 
involved. In tum, 1 predicted that children would retrieve their false beiief 
significantlv more often in the planning + action task, as compared to the standard 
task. This prediction was confirmed. 
Children's hcreased ability to retrieve their false belief in the plannine + 
action task, as compared to the standard task, can also be interpreted within the 
framework of the theory-theory. Ln the planninp: + action task, children's belief 
was highlighted bv having them plan, as  well as act, on the basis of their beiief in a 
goal-directed manner. Thus, when asked the false belief question, children may 
have been less prone to answer incorrectly given that, moments earlier, they had 
formulated a plan, and performed an action, that were both premised on their 
false belief. This amplified planning + action context may have succeeded in 
providing children with stronger counter-evidence to their incomplete theory of 
belief, which in tum deterred them from providing a reality-based response. The 
unavailability of such counter-evidence in the standard task, may have accounted 
for the significantly fewer correct responses observed in this task. 
An alternative manner in which children's improved performance in the 
plannin~ + action task may be interpreted is related to the notion of "relevance" as 
described by Barreau and Morton (1999). These authors argue that in a standard 
unexpected contents task, children initially hold the belief that the box contains its 
expected contents (e.g., Smarties), but that this belief becomes unavailable upon 
their discovery of the true contents of the box (e.g., box contains pencils). 
However, it is important to note that the hypothesis is not that this belief is 
irretrievable, but merely inaccessible under standard testing conditions. 
The authors argue that one factor that may contribute to whether or not the 
child's belief will be accessible is its relevance. With respect to the standard 
unexpected contents task, the authors' reasoning is as follows: The initial question 
requiring children to state their belief about the contents of the box (e.g., What do 
you think is inside the box?), sets up a "local goal" of finding out what is inside 
the box. Any additional uiformation is then organized in relation to this goal, and 
domat ion  that is deemed relevant will be preserved. Thus, although duldren 
initially represent the Smarties box as containing Smarties, once the box is opened 
to reveal pencils, the child's initial representation (e.g., "Smarties") becomes 
irrelevant to their goal, and is thus updated. Although older children and adults 
are capable of holding both of these pieces of information in mind, it is argued that 
younger children cannot due, in part, to limitations on their memory capacity. 
However, Barreau and Morton argue that it is possible to overcome this difficulty 
if a "record" of children's initial belief is made, "...in order to help dllldren 
remember what they had thought about the contents of the Smarties tube, their 
original belief representation had to be kept relevant to the current experience 
long enough for it to be transferred to LTM (long term memory)" (p. 77). Clearly, 
one rvav to keep children's belief relevant to them is to have them plan, and then 
act, on the basis of their belief, as was the case in the plannine + action task. 
Although my prediction was that children would also perfom signihcantly better 
on the action task, as compared to the standard task, it could perhaps be argued 
that this manipulation was not quite powerful enough. However, it is also possible 
that this difference rnay have been detected had there been more than 12 children 
in Experiment 2 whose performance varied across the three tasks. Although a 
"plan onlv" (i.e., no action involved) task was not included in Experiment 2, it 
would be interesting to determine in future research whether planning on its own 
would also significantly bolster children's ability to retrieve a false belief. 
Finally, it should be noted that the "relevance-based" account described 
above is not incompatible with the notion of counter-evidence. Indeed, any 
manipulation that serves to render a belief more relevant should, in hm, provide 
stronger counter-evidence to a theory of belief that does not include false belief as 
an explanatory constnict. 
How acknowledm a false belief mav differ from emlaining an action vremised 
on a false belief 
An interesting finding in Experirnents 1 and 2 was that chüdren who 
responded correctly to the false belief question did not necessarily go on to 
correctly explain their earlier action. A similar dissociation has recently been 
observed in a study by Clements et al. (2000). In their study, a Iag was reported 
between children's ability to correctly predict the protagonist's action in a change- 
in-location task (e.g., Where is Maxi going to look?), and their ability to correctly 
justifv their prediction (e.g., Why will he look there?). On the basis of this finding, 
the authors have argued that an understanding of false belief cannot merely be 
reduced to correct responses on a standard false belief question. A similar c l a h  
can be made with respect to the findings from Experiments 1 and 2. That is, 
children who were successful in retrieving their earlier belief were not always 
successful in explaining their earlier action. For those instances in Experiment 1 in 
which children passed the false belief question, 35% = 21) of their ensuing 
explanations were not correct. In Experiment 2, this figure was 57% = 8). 
This finding suggests that the false belief and action ex~lanation questions 
may be tapping different aspects of children's understanding of false belief. This is 
an important point to highlight given that in the theory of mind literature 
children's understanding of false belief is often assessed on the basis of their one- 
word response to a standard false belief question. Children who respond correctly 
to this question are granted an understanding of false belief, whereas those who 
answer incorrectly are not. Yet, the results of Experirnents 1 and 2 suggest that 
such an approach may not be hlly warranted. That is, in these two studies, there 
existed a sub-group of children who answered the false belief question correctly, 
but were unable to correctly explain their action. Why then, might it be the case 
that children can correctly judge that they held a false belief, but be unable to 
explain an action of theirs that was premised on this belief? 
Lee and Homer (1999) list three fundamental assumptions that we hold 
about the mind. First, we believe that the mind exists. Second, we believe that the 
mind consists of various mental states, including intention, knowledge, and belief. 
Third, we believe that there exist causal links between the mind, extemal 
environments, and actions (the causalitv assumption). It is this last assumption 
that bears the most relevance to the current discussion. In terms of causality, it is 
possible to assess children's representation of another person's (or their own) false 
belief without r e q u i ~ g  them to make any causal inferences about action. This 
would be the case when children are asked the false belief question in the context 
of a standard unexpected contents task. In such a context diildren need only 
represent their earlier belief without having to make any additional causal 
inferences about how a character will behave (Lee & Horner, 1999). However, in 
both the action and the plannina + action tasks, the element of causality is 
introduced. To correctly explain their action, children must represent the causal 
Link between an earlier mental, or physical, state, and their ensuing action. 
There are a number of studies that have shown that, in the physical realm, 
children are sensitive to the faa that a cause must precede its effect (e.g., Bullock 
& Gelman, 1979; Gopnik, Sobel, Sdiulz, & Glymour, in press). However, a series of 
studies conducted by Povinelli and his colleagues (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 
1996; Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, & Castille, 1999) have revealed a striking 
limitation in an aspect of presdiool children's understanding of causality. In these 
studies, 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were videotaped while playing a game with 
an experimenter. During the videotaping, unbeknownst to the child, the 
experimenter covertly placed a stidcer on the a d ' s  head. Several minutes later, 
the child was shown a video playbadc of the previous events, including the 
segment in which the experimenter placed the sticker on the child's head. The 
dependent measure of interest was whether children would reach up to remove 
the sticker. Although the researchers expected that even the youngest children 
would do this, results indicated otherwise. None of the 2-year-olds, and O* 
about 25% of the 3-year-olds, responded in this way. It was only by 4 years of age 
that a substantial number of the children (75%) reached up to remove the sticker 
(Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). 
Povinelli (2001) has argued that the findings from this delaved self- 
recoenition task suggest that children do not understand how recent past events, 
that the self has experienced, are causauy c o ~ e c t e d  to the self's current 
experiences. That is, the 2- and 3-year-old children in the delayed self-recognition 
task seemed unable to understand how a past event (sticker being put on their 
head) bore any relation to their current self. Similarly, one could argue that the 3- 
year-old children in the present studies had difficulty conceptualizing how a past 
mental state (i.e., their false belief), that had become outdated, could have caused 
their action. Given this interpretation, should children's difficulty on the action 
exvlanation question be reduced to a specific difficulty in causal reasoning, apart 
f-rom any sort of difficulty with false belief? Although it is perhaps tempting to do 
so, it may be that the relationship between dùldren's understanding of false belief, 
and their understanding of the "temporal self" is not quite so simple. 
Recently, Barresi (2001) has argued that children's performance on false 
belief tasks is related to an understanding of the concept that the self extends 
through time, and more specificaily, that mental states of the self c m  change over 
tirne. Barresi states that, " . . . to understand mental states as representational rather 
than as presentational states of the world, or of the organism, it rnay be necessasr 
to conceive of the individuai mind as existing outside of a particular t h e "  (p. 
157). Thus, part of what acquiring an understanding of f a k  belief might entai1 is 
the ability to acknowledge how successive states of the self (physical or mental) 
are causally comected through t h e .  
The fact that there existed a sub-group of children who responded corredly 
to the false belief question, but incorrectly to the action exdanation question, may 
have been because the action exdanation question provided a more stringent test 
of children's understanding that a past mental state, that has channed, is 
nevertheless causally connected to the present. Although duldren may be able to 
correctly acknowledge that they held a false belief, it may be more difficuit for 
them to identiQ this outdated belief as the cause of their prier action. However, 
because the relationship between children's understanding of false belief and their 
understanding of the temporal self is not yet clear, this claim remains speculative. 
Lndeed, I believe that a very fruitful direction for theory of mind research is one 
that takes into account concurrent developments in the child's understanding of 
the temporal self. 
Children's false belief verformance: Conceptual diange - or earlv cornpetence? 
Based on the results of a recent meta-analysis, W e h a n  et al. (2001) have 
argued that diildren's performance on false belief tasks reflects a process of 
conceptual change. By conceotual chantzg Wehan et al. (2001) mean that 
changes in diildren's performance on false belief tasks reflect genuine changes in 
"children's conceptions of persons" (p. 671). In contrast, proponents of an early 
cornpetence view argue that children do not lack the concept of false belief. but 
rather, that their poor performance on false belief tasks is attributable to 
"information-processing limits, unnecessarily demanding tasks, or confusing 
questions" (Wellman et al., 2001, p. 672). Given that there exist these two opposing 
views with respect to children's understanding of false belief, it is not surprising 
that in an ensuing commentary to Wellman et al. (2001), Scholl and Leslie (2001) 
argue that the results of the meta-analysis do not rule out early competence 
accounts. Clearly, this debate has not yet been settled. 
I believe that the results of the present thesis can contribute to this debate, 
as well as raise further questions as to the nature of duldren's understanding of 
false belief. Three-year-old drildren's difficulty with false belief tasks is a striking 
one. In fact, 1 cannot help being mildly surprised each time I witness a 3-year-old 
child failing this task. I am evidently not the only one, given the number of studies 
which have sought to determine whether, under the right circumstances, 3-year- 
old children can achieve success on this task (e.g., Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991; 
Salûnarsh & Mitchell, 1998). Moreover, I cannot deny that part of my motivation 
for designmg my thesis experiments stemmed from rny belief that there existed a 
method that would allow a substantial number of 3-year-olds to pass a false belief 
task. However, in many ways, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 have shown that, 
in retrosped, my belief was false! In these studies duldren acted, and in some 
cases planned, and then acted, on the basis of their belief, yet, a majority of them 
were unable to rehieve their belief, either when asked a standard false belief 
question, or when asked to explain their action. h the plaminn + action task, in 
which children received the most powerful dose of counter-evidence, 1 would 
argue that failure to appeal to a false belief reflected an incomplete concept of 
belief. Arguably, no amount of conter-evidence would have allowed these 
children to retrieve their false belief because the notion of "false belief" may not 
have been part of their conceptual lexicon. in other words, there was no "false 
belief" available tor hem to retrieve. In this sense, 1 would agree with the view 
that preschoolers' concept of belief shifts from one that does not include the notion 
that the mind can misrepresent reality, to one that does. 
Although a number of studies have shown an earlier competence in 
children's understanding of false belief, it is not fully clear whether the 
manipulations used in these studies are assessing the same understanding of false 
belief that older duldren might possess. Indeed, even Freeman and Lacohée (1995) 
acknowledge the possibility that, " . . .the mes we provided do not hirn 3- year-olds 
into 4-year-olds for the p q o s e s  of the test but enable 3-year-olds to succeed by 
direct recall instead of inferential reconstruction" (p. 56). Yet, it would seem 
important for the early competence view to show that the 3-year-old diild's 
understanding of false belief is relatively shi lar  to that of the 4year-old, but that 
thts understanding is masked because of task factors unrelated to false belief. 
Wellrnan et al. (2001) have voiced similar concerns about the manipulations 
intended to bolster the performance of 3-year-olds: "The manipulation may have 
resulted in a better, more sensitive test of young children's understanding, or it 
mav have resulted in an artifactually easy task that is prone to false positives" (p. 
679). 
However, one way in which it may be possible to circumvent this difficulty 
is to look at various aspects of false belief understanding within the same child. 
For instance, in Experiments 1 and 2, duldren were not only asked to rehieve their 
false belief, but were also asked to explain an action of theirs that was premised on 
this belief. As such, it was possible to obtain an additional measure of children's 
understanding of false belief. Thus, we can be relatively certain that children who 
were able to correctly respond to the false belief question, as well as appeal to a 
false belief to explain their action, had a well-grounded understanding of false 
belief. in contrast, children who responded incorrectly to the false belief question, 
and who were unable to appeal to a false belief to explain their action might be 
characterized as lacking the concept of false belief. Of course, it is more difficult to 
characterize the children who displayed other types of response patterns. 
Despite this difficulty, 1 believe that future studies should aim to assess 
various aspects of chldren's understanding of false belief. h turn this would lead 
to a richer understanding of the developments that occur specifically within the 
diild's understanding of this concept. Ultimately, such a method of research might 
lead to the conclusion that diildren's acquisition of false belief is a more gradua1 
and multi-faceted process than the conceptual change view might suggest. 
Limitations of the Current Research 
From the outset, 1 have stressed the importance of devising a methodology 
that highlights the inconsistency between the childfs action and the current state of 
the world. This inconsistency was hypothesized to motivate diildren to appeal to 
their ialse belief to explain their action. Although this general daim has also been 
put forth bv other researchers (e.g., Moses and Flavell, 1990), it remains undear 
how 3-vear-old children generallv react to inconsistencies that they may encounter 
in various domains. As such, one could argue that in Expenments 1 and 2, the low 
incidence of responses to the action exdanation question that included a reference 
to a false belief was due to the fact that children are not generally good at 
detecting inconsistencies. As such, they are not motivated to resolve them. In 
essence, this would imply that attempting to bolster a 3-year-old child's 
performance in any domain by exposing them to inconsistency would be of Little 
use. 
However, an alternative argument that 1 propose, is that chiidren begùi to 
detect inconsistencies in a certain domain when they are in the midst of acquiring 
a new understanding, or theory, in that domain. Indeed, from the standpoint of 
the theory-theory, how children acquire an understanding of the mind hinges on 
their ability to detect inconsistencies, and to capitalize on these, in order to 
develop theories that provide more explanatory power. Indeed, what "counier- 
evidence" boils d o m  to is evidence that is inconsistent with, or "counter" to, an 
existing theory. Implicit to the theory-theory then, is the assumption that diildren 
who are in the process of theory change are able to detect inconsistency. 
In the present studies, children who explained their action by referring to 
the current contents of the box (e.g., "because there was sand in there") could be 
characterized as not having detected an inconsistency between their incorrect 
reality-based response and their action. That is, these children were willing to 
explain their action in a manner that was inconsistent with their belief. However, 
it would be interesting to assess how these same children would react to an 
inconsistent scenario which retained the same structure as the action task, but that 
was rernoved from the realm of false belief. 
Although there dws not exist any research that has examined children's 
abilitv to de tect inconsistency in a way that parallels the inconsistency that 
children are faced with in the action and the plannine + action tasks, it would be 
possible to set up such a scenario. For instance, given that 3-year-old children 
reason well about desires, one could set up the following task. Children see a 
cookie on a snack table and are told, "Oh, look at that yummy cookie, do you want 
to eat it?" Once children respond that they would, they are told that they c m  go 
get it. However, once they readi the table, they find out that the cookie is made of 
plastic. If asked to explain why they went to the table, 1 suspect that children 
would respond "because 1 wanted to eat the cookie," and not, "because 1 wanted 
to eat the plastic." Such a finding would allow us to conclude that children cari 
detect inconsistencies, but only in those domains in which they have at least a 
rudimenta- understanding of the concept (e.g., desire) that is being tested. 
However, this claim is merely speculative as the results of Experiments 1 and 2 
cannot address whether this wodd indeed be the case. 
A methodological issue that arises from Experiments 1 and 2 is whether 
children's responses would have differed had they been asked the action 
ex~lanation question first, and the false belief question second. For instance, in the 
crayon box task, after the candles are revealed, children would be asked to explain 
whv they went to get the paper. In this case, an inconsistency also arises, but here, 
it is between the child's action and the tme contents of the box (e.g., candles). Ln 
Experiments 1 and 2 (in which children were asked the adion explmation 
question second), the inconsistency that arose was between the child's action, and 
the child's incorrectly stated belief about the contents of the box (e.g., candles). 
Both of these question orders (Le., action exdanation question first or action 
ex~lanation question second), create an inconsistency, and as such, 1 would expect 
that the action ex~lanation question would take longer for diildren to answer than 
the false belief question, even if it were asked first. However, it would perhaps be 
interesting to examine whether diildren's responses would indeed differ if they 
were asked the test questions in the reversed order. 
A related issue is whether the methodology of Experiments 1 and 2 pointed 
out the inconsistency clearly enough to the children. For instance, one could argue 
that an alternative marner to structure the false belief question would have been 
to include an explicit temporal reference to the child's prior action (e.g., When you 
went to get the paper, what did you think was inside the box?). However, a 
concem with this format, is whether it truly requires children to access their earlier 
belief, rather than sirnply make an association between "paper," and "crayons." 
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see whether a "temporally explicit" 
wording such as this, would increase children's correct responses to the false 
belief question. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the children in these studies 
were only exposed to a few instances of counter-evidence. However, it is likely 
that to observe a significant change in behaviour, children would need to witness 
a number of these instances over a more prolonged penod of tirne. 
Conclusions 
The present studies have made an important contribution to the current 
research on children's understanding of false belief. First, they have shown that 3- 
vear-old children do not readilv appeal to a false belief, even in those instances in 
which thev are asked to explain an action of theirs that was premised on a false 
belief. However, in this same context, nonverbal aspects of children's responses 
suggest that children may be gaining an awareness of false belief as a possible 
explanatory consmict. Interestingly, merely asking children about an earlier false 
belief (i.e., asking them a standard false belief question) does not appear to foster 
su& an awareness. However, the results of these studies have also revealed that 
the relationship between faise belief and action is a complicated one, as was 
highlighted in the discussion of children's understanding of the temporal self. 
Thus, in some cases, children's difficulty in explaining an action by appealing to a 
false belief may be affected by an incomplete understanding of how past States of 
the self are related to the self's current experiences. This issue has not been raised 
in previous studies which have exarnined how chîldren explain an action that was 
premised on a false belief, but is a relevant one. hdeed, it is an issue that future 
research should address. 
Second, these studies have highlighted the difficulty in categorizing 
children as either having, or not having, an understanding of false belief. Rather 
than viewing children's acquisition of false belief as an all-or-none process, I 
believe that there exists a continuum along which children's understanding must 
be situated. In tum, this suggests the need to assess children's understanding of 
hlse belief by employing methods that tap different aspects of such an 
understanding. As such, 1 find it difficult to fully ascribe to either the conceptual 
change or early cornpetence views of children's acquisition of false belief. In 
support of the conceptual change view, 1 believe that my results have shown that 
3- yea r-old child ren do not fully undestand the concept of false belief. Moreover, 
for many of these children, even the most facilitative contexts will not likely enable 
them to reason in terms of false belief, because this concept is one that they do not 
appear to possess. However, 1 also believe that my results have shown that a 
finer-grained distinction must be made with respect to diildren's understanding 
of ialse belief. Ultimately, I believe that doing so may reveal that the concept of 
false belief is made up of various components that are not al1 acquired 
simultaneously, and are not al1 a function of the same underlying skill. 
Appendix A 
Experiment 1 Protocol 
Cravon box 
What do you t h k  is inside the box? (crayons). You know what, there's some 
paper over there. Why don? you get it to draw on with the crayons. Okay, let's 
open the box and look inside (show candles, and then close up box). Before, when 
you first saw the box al1 closed up like this, what did you think was inside? 
If incorrect: Why did you go get the paper then? 
If correct: What is inside the box? Why did you go get the paper? 
Juice box 
What do you think is inside the box? (juice). You know what, there's a cup over 
there. Why don? you get it so that you can drink some juice. Okay, let's pour. Oh 
look, there's sand in here (show sand, and then put back in carton). Before, when 
you first saw the box al1 closed up like this, what did you think was inside? 
If incorrect: Why did you go get the cup then? 
If correct: What is inside the box? Why did you go get the cup? 
Appendix B 
Children's action explmations 
Examdes from the Cravon box Trial 
Children who failed the False Belief Ouestion 
1 Explmation 
'Cause 1 thought it was crayons 
' Um, uh, let me think, 'cause 1 thought there was crayons inside 
Because 1.. . Because 1 wanted to colour 
' Because I wanted to draw 
To use the crayons 
It says crayon box 
There was some candles 
Because there was no crayons 
1 Where's the paper? 
1 










Children who ~assed  the False Belief Ouestion 
Explanation 1 Code 
Because there - 1 thought there was cravons Belief 
1 think there were crayons in there Belief 
I Because 1 wanted to draw Desire 
Um, because 1 wanted to draw Desire 
So 1 could colour Goal I 
To colour with crayons Goal 




Because 1 got it  over there Irrelevant 
Examples from the Juice box Trial 
Children who failed the False Belief Ouestion 
Explanation Code 
'Cause 1 thought it was juice klief 
Because there was San.. .I thought there was orange juice in there Belief 
'Cause to drink it Goal 
Because I was thirsty Ph ysical 
Because I wanted to put some sand in it Post-ac tion 
Because there - there's no juice in here before Pos t-ac tion 
Wow, because 1 knew it was there Irrclevan t 
The - there, it was on the floor Irrelevan t 
Children who passed the False BeIief Question 
Explanation 
L 
Probablv because 1 thought it was juice 
Because 1 thought it was a drink 
Because 1 wanted a drink 
1 'Cause me wanted orange juice 
I 
For orange juice 
I 
For drinking 
Bec(ause) - to put the sand in 
1 Because there was sand in there 
I 
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Table 1 
Res~onses to the False Belief Ouestion (n = 126) broken down bv Trial order and 
bv Trial tvDe in Experiment 1 
Trial order 
Trial Type First Second 
Correct responses 
Crayon box 17 14 
j uice box 13 19 
Incorrect responses 
Crayon box 
Juice box 17 
Reçvonse latencv Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for instances in 
which children failed the False Beiief Question in Ex~eriment 1 
M (s) - - SD (SI 
Trial 1 
Action Exp lana tion Ques lion 2.47 
Trial 2 
False Belief Question 
False Belief Question 
Action Explanation Question 1.97 
Table 3 
Response latencv Means (Ml and Standard Deviations (SD) for instances in 
which chiIdren ~assed  the False Belief Ouestion and correctly resvonded to the 
Action Ex~hnation Chestion in Ex~eriment 1 
Trial 1 
False Belief Question 
Action Explana tion Question 1.90 
Trial 2 
False Belief Question 
Action Explanation Question 1 . l3  
Table 4 
NumUer of correct responses (n = 171 to the false belief auestions broken down 
bv task order and bv task tme in Ex~eriment 2 
Task order 
Task type 
Planning + Action Action Standard 
-- - -- - -  
Note. P + A = Planning + action task; A = Action task; S = standard task 
Table 5 
Pattern of children's (n = 12) correct responses to the false belief auestion for the 
Standard. Action, and Planning + Action tasks in Exwriment 2 
Task Number of Children 
Standard onlv O 
Action only 
P l a ~ i n g  + Action onlv 
Standard and Action 
Standard and Planning + Action 
Action and Planning + Action 2 
Table 6 
Breakdown of children's remonses to the Action Exdanation Ouestion (in '10) in 
Ex~eriment 2 
Task 
Explanation tvpe Action Planning + Action 
Pre-action 
Pos t-ac tion 
irrelevant 
No response 
False Belief Question Failers 









False Belief Question Passers 






Percerrtage ofcorrect veau incorrect responses to die Action E x p h t P n  Question 
in Experknt 1 
Correct Expianations 
Incorrect Explamtions 
Failed both Fsilse Belief Faikd one False Beüef Passed both Faise 
Questions Question Belief Questions 
Figure 2 
Percentage of children who answered the hlse belief question correctlv for each of the 
three tasks in Experiment 2 
Standard Act ion 
Task type 
Planning + Action 
